First Antitrust Whistleblower Reward Under the Pilot Program: DOJ and USPS Pay $1 Million

On January 29, 2026, the U.S. Department of Justice Antitrust Division and the U.S. Postal Service announced the first whistleblower reward ever paid under the Antitrust Whistleblower Rewards Program.

A whistleblower received $1 million after providing information that helped bring criminal antitrust and fraud charges against EBLOCK Corporation, which resolved the case through a deferred prosecution agreement (DPA) and agreed to pay a $3.28 million criminal fine. The conduct involved alleged bid rigging that affected online auctions for used vehicles and alleged shill bidding that used fake bids to artificially inflate prices [1].

The First Payout Signals a New Era for Criminal Antitrust Enforcement

For years, criminal antitrust enforcement relied heavily on corporate self-reporting and the classic “race to the courthouse” created by the Antitrust Division’s Leniency Program, as well as well as whistleblowers who were limited to False Claims Act antitrust cases if the matter was tied into increased costs for the United States government. The January 29, 2026 announcement adds a major accelerant: a direct financial incentive for individuals to secretly report cartel conduct before a company can position itself for leniency [1].

The DOJ framed the payout as a milestone. It is not just about one case, it is also a public marker that the rewards program is real, funded, and capable of generating seven figure awards relatively quickly. According to the Postal Inspection Service, the award came only six months after the Whistleblower Rewards Program began [1].

What Happened at EBLOCK’s Acquired Auction Platform

EBLOCK operates an online auction platform for used vehicles. In November 2020, EBLOCK acquired another used vehicle auction platform identified in court filings as Company A. DOJ alleges EBLOCK did not promptly stop ongoing collusive misconduct at Company A after the acquisition [1].

According to DOJ, between November 2020 and February 2022, individuals at Company A conspired with individuals at Company B to suppress and eliminate competition for used vehicles sold on Company A’s online auction platform. DOJ says this violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act. DOJ also alleges EBLOCK did not promptly stop “shill bidding” on Company A’s platform. DOJ describes shill bidding as the placement of fake bids intended to artificially increase sales prices for used vehicles, and it ties that conduct to wire fraud [1].

Bid Rigging and Shill Bidding: What These Allegations Mean in Plain Terms

Bid rigging is an antitrust crime

Bid rigging is a form of collusion where competitors agree in advance who will win bids or auctions, often by coordinating maximum bids, dividing inventory, or sharing confidential bidding information. In this matter, DOJ describes employees at Company A and Company B allegedly sharing bidding information and agreeing on maximum bids for certain vehicles [1].

Section 1 of the Sherman Act broadly prohibits agreements that restrain trade in interstate commerce. In criminal cases, conduct like price fixing, bid rigging, and market allocation is often treated as the core of “hardcore” cartel behavior [1].

Shill bidding can cross into fraud

The DOJ alleges the conspirators coordinated to relist vehicles and place shill bids designed to push prices higher for legitimate buyers. DOJ further alleges they misrepresented the number and identity of fake bidders by commissioning software that placed bids under the names of real auto dealerships without consent. Wire fraud law generally targets schemes to defraud using interstate wire communications. DOJ’s press release cites 18 U.S.C. § 1343 in connection with the alleged shill bidding [1].

Why USPS Is Involved: The “Mail Nexus” Matters

The press release highlights an important feature of the program and the investigation: documents supporting the scheme were sent via U.S. Mail, and DOJ credited the U.S. Postal Inspection Service as a key partner [1].

The Antitrust Division works with the U.S. Postal Inspection Service and the U.S. Postal Service Office of Inspector General to pay rewards to whistleblowers. That partnership is not window dressing. For potential whistleblowers it is an essential component of the program that imbues jurisdiction, so it must be alleged in the antitrust whistleblower submission[1].  According to antirust whistleblower lawyer Jason T. Brown, “This inaugural result of the DOJ Pilot Program antirust whistleblower program shows the great fusion of the private public partnership when it comes to whistleblower cases.  In an accelerated amount of time an amazing result was obtained and the government should learn in its more glacial programs the opportunity to expedite important matters like this.”

The Deferred Prosecution Agreement and the $3.28 Million Criminal Fine

DOJ reports that EBLOCK resolved the criminal antitrust and fraud charges through a deferred prosecution agreement, under which EBLOCK agreed to pay a $3.28 million criminal fine. In addition to the fine, DOJ states the DPA requires remedial measures, including implementing an appropriate compliance program and cooperating with the ongoing investigation and any resulting prosecutions [1].

More broadly, DOJ guidance on corporate resolutions emphasizes that when the Department resolves corporate criminal liability through agreements such as DPAs, it typically expects an agreed statement of facts and conditions designed to promote punishment, deterrence, public protection, and remediation [8].

How the Antitrust Whistleblower Rewards Program Works

The DOJ’s Antitrust Division states that whistleblowers who voluntarily report original information about antitrust and related offenses may be eligible for a reward if the information results in criminal fines or other recoveries of at least $1 million [1].

If eligible, the “presumptive” award amount is generally up to 30% of the amount collected, although the DOJ retains discretion in award decisions. This first payout matters because it broadcasts the program’s practical impact: the whistleblower program works and it can work expeditiously.[1].

Anti retaliation protections and confidentiality for antitrust whistleblowers

The U.S. Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division has publicly emphasized two protections that often determine whether individuals feel safe coming forward: anti-retaliation safeguards and confidentiality practices.

Anti retaliation: Criminal Antitrust Anti-Retaliation Act (CAARA)

A federal whistleblower protection statute, the Criminal Antitrust Anti-Retaliation Act (CAARA), protects individuals from retaliation for reporting potential criminal antitrust violations or for assisting in related investigations or proceedings.

According to guidance from the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), CAARA’s protections apply broadly to employees and may also extend to certain non-employees, such as contractors or agents, depending on the nature of the working relationship. Prohibited retaliation includes termination, demotion, suspension, threats, harassment, blacklisting, and other adverse employment actions.

CAARA is enforced through OSHA’s administrative process and provides employment-related remedies, such as reinstatement, back pay, compensatory damages, and attorneys’ fees. CAARA does not create a standalone monetary whistleblower reward program; its purpose is protection from retaliation, not financial incentives. [4].

Confidentiality: minimizing the risk of exposure

The DOJ Antitrust Division has stated it takes whistleblower confidentiality seriously and will not publicly disclose information that could reasonably be expected to reveal a whistleblower’s identity except as required by law or DOJ policy, for law enforcement purposes, or in connection with judicial or administrative proceedings. The policy also states the Division takes reasonable steps to minimize the risk of public identification [3].

Key Takeaways for Potential Whistleblowers in Competition Cases

This DOJ announcement is a practical blueprint for how cartel conduct can be uncovered, prosecuted, and monetarily rewarded:

• Digital markets still produce old fashioned cartel behavior. Online auctions, user permissions, and bidding data can become tools for collusion when insiders abuse access [1].
• Fraud and antitrust can travel together. DOJ tied bid rigging allegations to the Sherman Act and shill bidding to wire fraud, reflecting how one scheme can trigger multiple criminal theories [1].
• Timing is leverage. DOJ messaging explicitly warns companies that employees and their attorneys now have stronger incentives to report quickly, potentially beating a corporate leniency strategy [1].

Nothing in this article is legal advice. But as a general matter, anyone considering reporting potential antitrust crimes should think carefully about preserving evidence lawfully, avoiding retaliation traps, and understanding how confidentiality and reporting channels work.

How Brown, LLC Helps Whistleblowers Navigate High Stakes Reporting

Whistleblowing in criminal antitrust cases is not just about doing the right thing. It can involve career risk, complex confidentiality issues, and fast-moving enforcement dynamics. the antitrust whistleblower law firm Brown, LLC represents whistleblowers with a focus on protecting clients, evaluating eligibility pathways, and helping present credible information in a way that supports government action.

If you believe you have original information about bid rigging, price fixing, market allocation, or related fraud tied to competition crimes, Brown, LLC can help you understand the process and your options under applicable whistleblower protection laws.

[1] https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/antitrust-division-and-us-postal-service-award-first-ever-1m-payment-whistleblower-reporting

[2] https://www.justice.gov/atr/whistleblower-rewards

[3] https://www.justice.gov/atr/confidentiality-policy-regarding-complainants

[4] https://www.osha.gov/sites/default/files/publications/OSHA4174.pdf

[5] https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/15/1

[6] https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/1343

[7] https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/15/7a-3

[8] https://www.justice.gov/jm/jm-9-28000-principles-federal-prosecution-business-organizations