

**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA**

SHAYLA STURGIS, individually and on
behalf of others similarly situated,

Plaintiff,

v.

ALBERTSONS COMPANIES, INC. and
SAFEWAY INC.,

Defendants.

Civil Action No. _____

**CLASS
AND COLLECTIVE ACTION
COMPLAINT**

Jury Trial Demanded

CLASS AND COLLECTIVE ACTION COMPLAINT

Plaintiff SHAYLA STURGIS ("Plaintiff"), individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, by and through her attorneys, Brown, LLC, brings this Class and Collective Action Complaint against Defendants ALBERTSONS COMPANIES, INC. and SAFEWAY INC. (collectively, "Defendants"), and alleges as follows:

INTRODUCTION

1. Plaintiff brings this collective and class action to recover unpaid overtime compensation arising from Defendants' common policy and practice of misclassifying Safeway Assistant Store Managers as exempt from overtime and failing to pay them overtime compensation for hours worked in excess of forty (40) in a workweek.

2. Plaintiff brings her federal overtime claim under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201, *et seq.* ("FLSA"), individually and on behalf of similarly situated Assistant Store Managers employed at Safeway stores within Defendants' Mid-Atlantic Division.

3. Plaintiff also brings Rule 23 class claims under the District of Columbia Minimum Wage Revision Act ("DCMWRA"), D.C. Code § 32-1001, *et seq.*, and the District of Columbia

Wage Payment and Collection Law ("DCWPCL"), D.C. Code § 32-1301, *et seq.*, individually and on behalf of all other Assistant Store Managers employed at Safeway stores in the District of Columbia.

4. Despite her "Assistant Manager" title, Plaintiff's primary duty during her employment was to perform routine store-floor work that is performed by hourly employees of the store. Plaintiff spent most of her typical workday stocking shelves, breaking down pallets, operating cash registers, fulfilling pickup orders, cleaning, packaging bakery and deli items, and covering understaffed departments.

5. Plaintiff was paid on a salary basis and regularly worked more than forty (40) hours per week without receiving overtime compensation.

6. Other similarly situated Assistant Store Managers were/are likewise paid on a salary basis and regularly worked/work more than forty (40) hours per week without receiving overtime compensation.

7. Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) on behalf of herself and the following FLSA Collective:

All individuals employed by one or both Defendants at Safeway stores within Defendants' Mid-Atlantic Division as Assistant Store Managers who were/are paid on a salary basis and classified as exempt from overtime at any time during the three years preceding the commencement of this action through the date of judgment (the "FLSA Collective").

8. Plaintiff brings her DCMWRA and DCWPCL claims pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 on behalf of herself and the following D.C. Class:

All individuals employed by one or both Defendants at Safeway stores in the District of Columbia as Assistant Store Managers who were/are paid on a salary basis and classified

as exempt from overtime at any time during the three years preceding the commencement of this action through the date of judgment (the "D.C. Class").

9. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and all other similarly situated Assistant Store Managers, seeks unpaid overtime compensation, liquidated damages, pre- and post-judgment interest, reasonable attorneys' fees and costs, and all other available relief.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

10. This Court has subject-matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff's FLSA claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 because that claim arises under federal law.

11. This Court has supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's District of Columbia claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367 because those claims arise from the same employment relationship, compensation practices, and course of conduct as Plaintiff's FLSA claim and form part of the same case or controversy.

12. Defendants organize their Safeway brand retail operations through geographically based operating divisions and empower decision-making at the divisional level.

13. Defendant Safeway Inc. is registered with the Pennsylvania Department of State as an active foreign business corporation authorized to do business in Pennsylvania.

14. Defendant Albertsons Companies, Inc. is registered with the Pennsylvania Department of State as an active foreign business corporation authorized to do business in Pennsylvania.

15. Under 15 Pa.C.S. §§ 411 and 412 and 42 Pa.C.S. § 5301(a)(2)(i), Defendants' registration and qualification to conduct business in Pennsylvania constitutes consent to the exercise of general personal jurisdiction by courts in Pennsylvania. *See Mallory v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co.*, 600 U.S. 122 (2023).

16. Accordingly, this Court may exercise general personal jurisdiction over Defendants with respect to the claims asserted in this action.

17. Defendants are subject to specific personal jurisdiction in this District. Defendants' Mid-Atlantic Division headquarters is located at 75 Valley Stream Parkway, Malvern, Pennsylvania 19355, within this District.

18. The Mid-Atlantic Division was formed through the combination of Safeway's former Eastern Division and ACME Markets and includes the Safeway store in which Plaintiff worked.

19. Defendants manage, administer, and oversee regional operations and employment practices applicable to Assistant Store Managers within the Mid-Atlantic Division through the divisional structure headquartered in Malvern, Pennsylvania.

20. Those regional practices include staffing expectations, labor allocation, compensation practices, and operational requirements affecting Assistant Store Managers employed throughout the Mid-Atlantic Division.

21. Plaintiff's claims and the claims of members of the proposed FLSA Collective arise out of or relate to Defendants' Pennsylvania-based divisional operations and oversight. Accordingly, this Court may also exercise specific personal jurisdiction over Defendants with respect to those claims.

22. Venue is proper in this District pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1), (b)(2), (c)(2), and (d) because Defendants are deemed to reside in this District for venue purposes and a substantial part of the acts and omissions giving rise to the challenged regional employment practices occurred in this District.

PARTIES

Defendants

23. Defendant Albertsons Companies, Inc. ("Albertsons") is a Delaware corporation with its principal executive offices located at 250 Parkcenter Boulevard, Boise, Idaho 83706.

24. Albertsons is the parent-level public company of a national food and drug retail enterprise that operates stores under numerous banners, including Safeway.

25. Albertsons conducts its retail business through operating subsidiaries and geographically based operating divisions.

26. Defendant Safeway Inc. ("Safeway") is a Delaware corporation with a principal address at 11555 Dublin Canyon Road, Pleasanton, California 94588.

27. Safeway operates grocery stores in the District of Columbia under the Safeway name and directly employed Plaintiff. Plaintiff's wage statements identify Safeway Inc. as her employer and reflect her salaried, exempt classification.

28. Defendants' Mid-Atlantic Division is located at 75 Valley Stream Parkway, Malvern, Pennsylvania 19355, and encompasses Safeway operations within the region, including but not limited to the Washington, D.C. store where Plaintiff worked, Safeway stores in Maryland, Virginia, and Delaware, and other Washington, D.C. stores.

29. Assistant Store Manager positions at Safeway are publicly advertised under Albertsons Companies branding and are described as positions within the Albertsons Companies organization.

30. Plaintiff's payroll was processed by Albertsons' Associate Experience Center (AEC).

31. Plaintiff also communicated concerning payroll matters with human-resources personnel using an @albertsons.com email address.

32. Albertsons and Safeway jointly participate, directly and through their Mid-Atlantic divisional structure, in material aspects of the employment of Assistant Store Managers, including the structure of the position, compensation practices, job duties, exemption classification, staffing and labor expectations, operational standards, and employment administration.

33. At all relevant times, Safeway was Plaintiff's employer and Albertsons jointly employed Plaintiff within the meaning of the FLSA and applicable District of Columbia wage laws, or alternatively acted directly or indirectly in the interest of Safeway in relation to Plaintiff and the employment practices challenged herein.

Plaintiff

34. Plaintiff is a resident of Baltimore, Maryland.

35. Safeway employed Plaintiff as an Assistant Store Manager at Safeway Store 2808, located at 3830 Georgia Avenue NW, Washington, D.C., from on or about October 26, 2025 through August 4, 2026.

36. Plaintiff was also assigned on occasion to cover other Safeway stores in the Washington, D.C. area.

37. Plaintiff was paid an annual salary of approximately \$71,500 per year.

38. Plaintiff regularly worked over forty (40) hours per workweek, which Defendants were aware of.

39. Throughout her employment, Defendants classified Plaintiff as exempt from overtime and did not pay her an overtime premium for hours worked over forty (40) in a workweek.

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

40. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates all preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.

41. At all relevant times, Defendants' retail operations have had an annual gross volume of sales made or business done of not less than \$500,000.

42. Defendants operate retail grocery stores that sell goods and materials that have moved in interstate commerce.

43. Plaintiff, other Assistant Store Managers, and other store employees regularly handled, stocked, received, sold, and otherwise worked with goods and materials that had moved in or were produced for interstate commerce.

44. Defendants' retail operations constitute an enterprise engaged in commerce within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 203(s).

45. At all relevant times, Defendants have been employers within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 203(d), and Assistant Store Managers have been employees within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 203(e).

46. Plaintiff's employment with Safeway ended on August 4, 2026.

47. At the time her employment ended, Defendants had not paid Plaintiff the overtime compensation alleged herein for hours worked in excess of forty (40) in a workweek.

Defendants' Business and Operational Control

48. Defendants operate numerous "Safeway" grocery stores through a geographically organized retail structure that includes Defendants' Mid-Atlantic Division.

49. Defendants' Mid-Atlantic Division provides the regional operating structure for Safeway and other retail banners within the Mid-Atlantic market.

50. Albertsons publicly states that its operating divisions are geographically based and that management reviews operating results and makes key operating decisions through its divisional structure.

51. Defendants use the Mid-Atlantic Division to coordinate and oversee regional store operations, resource allocation, labor expectations, and employment administration affecting Safeway stores within the Division.

52. Safeway employs Assistant Store Managers as part of its store staffing and organizational structure, which also includes Store Managers and hourly store employees.

53. Defendants maintain common job titles, compensation practices, exemption classifications, job expectations, and operational standards for Assistant Store Managers within the Mid-Atlantic Division.

54. Defendants possess and maintain records identifying Assistant Store Managers, their work locations, compensation amounts, employment dates, exemption classifications, job duties and schedules, and payroll information.

Classification, Supervision, and Compensation Practices

55. Defendants misclassified Plaintiff and other Assistant Store Managers within the Mid-Atlantic Division as salaried employees exempt from overtime.

56. Defendants classified Plaintiff and other Assistant Store Managers within the Mid-Atlantic Division as salaried employees exempt from overtime.

57. Defendants pay salaried Assistant Store Managers a fixed salary without an overtime premium when they work more than forty (40) hours in a workweek.

58. Plaintiff was told in substance that because she was salaried, she did not receive overtime compensation.

59. Plaintiff's wage statements consistently reported forty (40) hours even when she was scheduled for and worked more than forty (40) hours in a workweek.

60. Defendants maintain work schedules, payroll records, and other employment records for Assistant Store Managers.

61. Defendants did not accurately record all hours actually worked by Plaintiff and other Assistant Store Managers.

62. Defendants schedule Assistant Store Managers to work extended shifts and require and/or expect Assistant Store Managers to provide store-floor coverage when hourly staffing is insufficient.

63. Defendants establish labor budgets, staffing expectations, work requirements, and compensation practices that govern the work performed by Assistant Store Managers.

64. A public posting for Safeway's Assistant Store Manager position describes duties requiring sustained physical store-floor work, including walking throughout the store, stocking, and rotating product.

65. In reality, Plaintiff and all other similarly situated Assistant Store Managers' job duties do not meet any applicable exemption under the FLSA.

Assistant Store Managers' Primary Duties and Store-Floor Work

66. Plaintiff's typical workday began with a floor walk and attention to store conditions, pickup orders, cashier coverage, and employee callouts.

67. Throughout the remainder of her workday, Plaintiff performed routine store-floor work wherever labor was needed.

68. Plaintiff stocked merchandise, operated cash registers, fulfilled Drive Up & Go pickup orders, cleaned store areas, packaged bakery and deli items, and performed other routine customer-service and department work.

69. Plaintiff regularly broke down frozen-food pallets, separated frozen products by aisle, and stocked the frozen department because the store lacked sufficient employee coverage for that work from time to time.

70. Plaintiff spent the majority of a typical shift performing routine manual and store-floor “worker bee” duties just like other hourly employees did.

71. The work Plaintiff spent most of her time performing was substantially the same type of routine store-floor work performed by hourly store employees.

72. Plaintiff did not make any final personnel decisions.

73. Plaintiff did not have authority to hire employees.

74. The Store Manager retains final hiring authority.

75. The Store Manager was not required to follow Plaintiff’s or other Assistant Store Managers’ input or recommendations concerning applicants.

76. Plaintiff did not create employee schedules or have authority to approve schedule changes or employee vacation requests.

77. Department managers prepared schedules for their respective departments, and the Store Manager prepared the remaining store schedules.

78. Plaintiff did not possess authority to terminate employees.

79. The Store Manager retained final authority over discipline and termination.

80. Plaintiff’s suggestions and recommendations concerning hiring, firing, discipline, advancement, promotion, or other changes in employee status were not given particular weight.

81. Plaintiff was required to elevate significant personnel decisions to the Store Manager, including when the Store Manager was not physically present at the store.

82. Plaintiff's title and actual job duties did not reflect final authority over hiring, firing, discipline, or other consequential personnel decisions.

83. Plaintiff's primary duty was not the management of Defendants' enterprise or of a customarily recognized department or subdivision thereof.

84. When Plaintiff was assigned to assist at other Safeway stores, she worked alongside Assistant Store Managers from multiple stores who likewise spent substantial portions of their shifts performing routine store-floor work, including stocking shelves.

Overtime Practices and Workload Expectations

85. Plaintiff regularly worked at least forty-five (45) hours per week.

86. Plaintiff regularly worked beyond her scheduled hours by remaining at the store and continuing to work after scheduled shifts and reporting to work on scheduled days off.

87. Plaintiff worked more than fifty (50) hours during multiple workweeks, including weeks in which she reported to work on scheduled days off and weeks in which Defendants scheduled her to work six days for inventory.

88. Plaintiff's Store Manager communicated with Plaintiff by text message and directed or requested that she report to work on scheduled days off, which she did on multiple occasions.

89. Defendants did not pay Plaintiff any overtime premium for hours worked in excess of forty (40) in a workweek.

90. Defendants apply the same overtime exempt classification and compensation policy and practice to all other Assistant Store Managers within the Mid-Atlantic Division, paying

them a fixed salary without an overtime premium when they work more than forty (40) hours in a workweek.

91. Plaintiff understood her salary to compensate her for a forty-hour workweek.

92. Defendants did not tell Plaintiff that her salary was intended to compensate her for all hours worked in a workweek, however many or few.

93. Plaintiff did not agree that her salary would compensate her for all hours worked in a workweek, however many or few.

Plaintiff's Work Hours and Defendants' Knowledge

94. Defendants create and maintain work schedules for Assistant Store Managers and therefore know the hours Assistant Store Managers are scheduled to work.

95. Defendants also know or are reasonably expected to know when Assistant Store Managers remain at work beyond scheduled shifts or are directed to report on scheduled days off.

96. For example, during the representative workweek of May 17 through May 23, 2026, Defendants' scheduling system scheduled Plaintiff for approximately forty-six (46) hours.

97. Plaintiff worked more than forty (40) hours during that workweek.

98. Defendants did not pay Plaintiff an overtime premium for the hours she worked in excess of forty (40) during that workweek.

99. Plaintiff's wage statements reported forty (40) hours even when Defendants' scheduling records reflected a workweek exceeding forty (40) hours.

100. Defendants have actual or constructive knowledge of Plaintiff's overtime work through their scheduling records, store-level supervision, communications directing additional work, and the work Plaintiff performed for their benefit.

COLLECTIVE ACTION ALLEGATIONS

101. Plaintiff brings Count I as an FLSA collective action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) on behalf of herself and the FLSA Collective defined above.

102. Plaintiff is similarly situated to members of the FLSA Collective because they share the same or materially similar Assistant Store Manager position, salary-based compensation method, and exempt classification within Defendants' Mid-Atlantic divisional structure.

103. Defendants apply common job expectations and employment operating standards to salaried Assistant Store Managers at Safeway stores within the Mid-Atlantic Division.

104. The Assistant Store Manager position includes substantial store-floor and customer-service work associated with the daily operation and staffing of Safeway grocery stores.

105. Defendants pay Assistant Store Managers a fixed salary without an overtime premium for hours worked in excess of forty (40) in a workweek.

106. Defendants know or should know that Assistant Store Managers are regularly scheduled and do work more than forty (40) hours in a workweek.

107. The central factual and legal questions applicable to the FLSA Collective include whether Assistant Store Managers share the same or materially similar primary duties, whether Defendants properly classify them as exempt, whether Defendants know they work more than forty (40) hours a workweek, and whether Defendants owe overtime compensation under the FLSA.

108. Defendants' Mid-Atlantic Division operates approximately 111 Safeway stores. During Plaintiff's employment, Store 2808 employed between two and three Assistant Store Managers.

109. Other Safeway stores may employ one (1) to three (3) Assistant Store Managers depending on store size.

110. Based on the number of Safeway stores within the Division, the use of the Assistant Store Manager position, and employee turnover during the relevant period, Plaintiff estimates that the FLSA Collective includes hundreds of current and former Assistant Store Managers.

111. Defendants can easily identify the putative members of the FLSA Collective through their payroll, personnel, work schedule, job-code, classification, and location records maintained in the ordinary course of business.

112. Court-authorized notice is appropriate so that similarly situated Assistant Store Managers may receive notice of this action and make an informed decision whether to file written consents to join.

CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS

113. Plaintiff brings Counts II and III on behalf of the D.C. Class pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) and 23(b)(3).

114. The D.C. Class is defined above by objective employment, job-title, compensation, exemption-classification, geographic, and temporal criteria.

115. Defendants currently operate approximately eleven (11) Safeway stores in the District of Columbia. During Plaintiff's employment, Store 2808 employed between two and three Assistant Store Managers. Other Safeway stores may employ one (1) to three (3) Assistant Store Managers depending on store size. Based on the number of Safeway stores in the District, the use of the Assistant Store Manager position, and employee turnover during the relevant period, Plaintiff estimates that the D.C. Class consists of several dozen current and former Assistant Store Managers. The precise number is readily ascertainable from Defendants' payroll and personnel records.

116. Joinder of all D.C. Class members is impracticable in light of the estimated size of the Class and the inclusion of both current and former employees.

117. There are questions of law and fact common to the D.C. Class, including whether Defendants misclassify Assistant Store Managers as exempt; whether Assistant Store Managers perform the same or materially similar primary duties; the extent of their hiring, firing, disciplinary, and decision-making authority; whether the Assistant Store Managers worked over forty (40) hours a week; whether Defendants paid an overtime premium for those overtime hours; and whether Defendants' misclassification and compensation practices at issue violate the DCMWRA and DCWPCL.

118. Plaintiff's DCMWRA and DCWPCL claims are typical of the claims of the D.C. Class because she and other putative Rule 23 class members held the same Assistant Store Manager position, were paid on a salary basis, were classified as exempt from overtime, worked at Safeway stores in the District of Columbia, performed substantially similar job duties, and were subject to the same overtime compensation policy and practice.

119. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the D.C. Class. Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to those of the D.C. Class and has retained counsel experienced in wage-and-hour and representative litigation.

120. Common questions predominate over individual questions because liability turns principally on Defendants' common exemption classification and compensation practices, the materially similar duties and authority associated with the Assistant Store Manager position, and Defendants' payroll, personnel, scheduling, and classification records.

121. A class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the D.C. Class members' claims because individual overtime claims may be too small

to justify separate actions, class treatment avoids duplicative litigation, and Defendants' records can be used to easily identify the Class and determine the wages owed.

122. Plaintiff knows of no unusual difficulty that would make management of this action as a Rule 23(b)(3) class impracticable.

COUNT I

(Brought Individually and as a Collective Action)

Violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq.

FAILURE TO PAY OVERTIME WAGES

123. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates all preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.

124. Defendants classified Plaintiff and members of the FLSA Collective as exempt from overtime and paid them a fixed salary without an overtime premium for hours worked in excess of forty (40) in a workweek.

125. Plaintiff and members of the FLSA Collective do not meet the requirements of an applicable overtime exemption under the FLSA.

126. Defendants required or permitted Plaintiff and members of the FLSA Collective to work more than forty (40) hours in a workweek without paying overtime compensation at the rate required by the FLSA.

127. Defendants' violations of the FLSA are willful because Defendants knew or showed reckless disregard for whether their classification and overtime compensation policies and practices complied with the FLSA.

128. Pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), Plaintiff and members of the FLSA Collective who opt into this action are entitled to recover unpaid overtime compensation, an additional equal amount as liquidated damages, reasonable attorneys' fees and costs, and all other relief available under the FLSA.

COUNT II

(Brought Individually and on Behalf of the D.C. Class)

Violations of the District of Columbia Minimum Wage Revision Act, D.C. Code § 32-1001,

et seq.

FAILURE TO PAY OVERTIME WAGES

129. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates all preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.

130. At all relevant times, Defendants were employers, and Plaintiff and members of the D.C. Class were employees, within the meaning of the DCMWRA.

131. The DCMWRA requires employers to pay nonexempt employees overtime compensation at one and one-half times their regular rate of pay for hours worked in excess of forty (40) in a workweek. *See* D.C. Code § 32-1003(c).

132. Defendants misclassified Plaintiff and members of the D.C. Class as exempt from overtime, although they do not meet the requirements of an applicable overtime exemption under the DCMWRA.

133. Defendants required Plaintiff and members of the D.C. Class to work longer than forty (40) hours for many workweeks without paying the overtime compensation required by District of Columbia law.

134. As a result of Defendants' violations, Plaintiff and members of the D.C. Class are entitled to recover unpaid overtime wages, liquidated damages equal to treble the amount of unpaid wages pursuant to D.C. Code §§ 32-1012(b)(1) and 32-1308(a)(1)(A)(ii), reasonable attorneys' fees and costs, interest, and all other relief available under District of Columbia law.

COUNT III

(Brought Individually and on Behalf of the D.C. Class)

Violations of the District of Columbia Wage Payment and Collection Law, D.C. Code § 32-1301, et seq.

FAILURE TO PAY ALL EARNED WAGES

135. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates all preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.

136. At all relevant times, Defendants were employers, and Plaintiff and members of the D.C. Class were employees, within the meaning of the DCWPCL. The overtime compensation owed to Plaintiff and members of the D.C. Class constitutes "wages" within the meaning of D.C. Code § 32-1301(3).

137. The DCWPCL requires employers to pay all wages earned, including overtime compensation, on regular paydays and, upon an employee's discharge or resignation, within the time periods prescribed by D.C. Code §§ 32-1302 and 32-1303.

138. By failing to pay Plaintiff and members of the D.C. Class overtime compensation owed for hours worked in excess of forty (40) in a workweek, Defendants failed to pay all wages earned when due, in violation of D.C. Code §§ 32-1302 and 32-1303.

139. As a result of Defendants' violations, Plaintiff and members of the D.C. Class are entitled to recover, pursuant to D.C. Code § 32-1308, their unpaid wages, liquidated damages equal to treble the amount of unpaid wages, statutory penalties, reasonable attorneys' fees and costs, interest, and all other legal and equitable relief available under District of Columbia law, without duplicative recovery.

RELIEF REQUESTED

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court enter judgment in her favor and grant the following relief:

A. Certifying Count I as an FLSA collective action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) and authorizing notice to members of the FLSA Collective;

B. Certifying Counts II and III as a class action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) and 23(b)(3) on behalf of the D.C. Class;

C. Designating Plaintiff as representative of the FLSA Collective and the D.C. Class, and appointing undersigned counsel as counsel for the FLSA Collective and Class Counsel for the D.C. Class;

D. Ordering Defendants to disclose, in a reasonably usable electronic format, the names, last-known addresses, telephone numbers, email addresses, dates of employment, and work locations of members of the FLSA Collective for purposes of court-authorized notice;

E. Declaring that Defendants' classification and overtime compensation practices concerning the Assistant Store Managers alleged herein violate the FLSA, the DCMWRA, and the DCWPCL;

F. Finding that Defendants' violations of the FLSA were willful;

G. Awarding Plaintiff, members of the FLSA Collective who join this action, and members of the D.C. Class all unpaid overtime compensation due under applicable law;

H. Awarding liquidated damages under the FLSA and all liquidated damages equal to treble the amount of unpaid wages and other statutory relief available under District of Columbia law, without duplicative recovery;

I. Awarding pre-judgment and post-judgment interest to the extent permitted by law;

J. Awarding Plaintiff reasonable attorneys' fees and costs as provided by the FLSA and District of Columbia law; and

K. Awarding such other and further legal or equitable relief as the Court deems just and proper.

JURY DEMAND

Plaintiff demands a trial by jury on all issues so triable.

Dated: August 25, 2026

Respectfully Submitted,

BROWN, LLC

By: /s/ Achchana Ranasinghe

Achchana Ranasinghe (#337416)

Michael R. Rinderman (to seek *Pro Hac Vice* admission)

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Counsel for Plaintiff

CIVIL COVER SHEET

The JS 44 civil cover sheet and the information contained herein neither replace nor supplement the filing and service of pleadings or other papers as required by law, except as provided by local rules of court. This form, approved by the Judicial Conference of the United States in September 1974, is required for the use of the Clerk of Court for the purpose of initiating the civil docket sheet. (SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON NEXT PAGE OF THIS FORM.)

I. (a) PLAINTIFFS

SHAYLA STURGIS, individually and on behalf of others
similarly situated,

(b) County of Residence of First Listed Plaintiff Baltimore City
(EXCEPT IN U.S. PLAINTIFF CASES)

(c) Attorneys (Firm Name, Address, and Telephone Number)

Brown, LLC T: (877) 561-0000
111 Town Square Place, Suite 400 F: (855) 582-5297
Jersey City, NJ 07310

DEFENDANTS

ALBERTSONS COMPANIES, INC. and SAFEWAY INC.,

County of Residence of First Listed Defendant _____
(IN U.S. PLAINTIFF CASES ONLY)

NOTE: IN LAND CONDEMNATION CASES, USE THE LOCATION OF
THE TRACT OF LAND INVOLVED.

Attorneys (If Known)

II. BASIS OF JURISDICTION (Place an "X" in One Box Only)

- ☐ 1 U.S. Government Plaintiff ☒ 3 Federal Question (U.S. Government Not a Party)
- ☐ 2 U.S. Government Defendant ☐ 4 Diversity (Indicate Citizenship of Parties in Item III)

III. CITIZENSHIP OF PRINCIPAL PARTIES (Place an "X" in One Box for Plaintiff and One Box for Defendant)

- | | PTF | DEF | | PTF | DEF |
|---|----------------------------|----------------------------|---|----------------------------|----------------------------|
| Citizen of This State | ☐ 1 | ☐ 1 | Incorporated or Principal Place of Business In This State | ☐ 4 | ☐ 4 |
| Citizen of Another State | ☐ 2 | ☐ 2 | Incorporated and Principal Place of Business In Another State | ☐ 5 | ☐ 5 |
| Citizen or Subject of a Foreign Country | ☐ 3 | ☐ 3 | Foreign Nation | ☐ 6 | ☐ 6 |

IV. NATURE OF SUIT (Place an "X" in One Box Only)

Click here for: [Nature of Suit Code Descriptions.](#)

CONTRACT	TORTS	FORFEITURE/PENALTY	BANKRUPTCY	OTHER STATUTES
☐ 110 Insurance ☐ 120 Marine ☐ 130 Miller Act ☐ 140 Negotiable Instrument ☐ 150 Recovery of Overpayment & Enforcement of Judgment ☐ 151 Medicare Act ☐ 152 Recovery of Defaulted Student Loans (Excludes Veterans) ☐ 153 Recovery of Overpayment of Veteran's Benefits ☐ 160 Stockholders' Suits ☐ 190 Other Contract ☐ 195 Contract Product Liability ☐ 196 Franchise	PERSONAL INJURY ☐ 310 Airplane ☐ 315 Airplane Product Liability ☐ 320 Assault, Libel & Slander ☐ 330 Federal Employers' Liability ☐ 340 Marine ☐ 345 Marine Product Liability ☐ 350 Motor Vehicle ☐ 355 Motor Vehicle Product Liability ☐ 360 Other Personal Injury ☐ 362 Personal Injury - Medical Malpractice PERSONAL INJURY ☐ 365 Personal Injury - Product Liability ☐ 367 Health Care/Pharmaceutical Personal Injury Product Liability ☐ 368 Asbestos Personal Injury Product Liability PERSONAL PROPERTY ☐ 370 Other Fraud ☐ 371 Truth in Lending ☐ 380 Other Personal Property Damage ☐ 385 Property Damage Product Liability	☐ 625 Drug Related Seizure of Property 21 USC 881 ☐ 690 Other LABOR ☒ 710 Fair Labor Standards Act ☐ 720 Labor/Management Relations ☐ 740 Railway Labor Act ☐ 751 Family and Medical Leave Act ☐ 790 Other Labor Litigation ☐ 791 Employee Retirement Income Security Act IMMIGRATION ☐ 462 Naturalization Application ☐ 465 Other Immigration Actions	☐ 422 Appeal 28 USC 158 ☐ 423 Withdrawal 28 USC 157 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS ☐ 820 Copyrights ☐ 830 Patent ☐ 835 Patent - Abbreviated New Drug Application ☐ 840 Trademark ☐ 880 Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016 SOCIAL SECURITY ☐ 861 HIA (1395ff) ☐ 862 Black Lung (923) ☐ 863 DIWC/DIWW (405(g)) ☐ 864 SSID Title XVI ☐ 865 RSI (405(g)) FEDERAL TAX SUITS ☐ 870 Taxes (U.S. Plaintiff or Defendant) ☐ 871 IRS—Third Party 26 USC 7609	☐ 375 False Claims Act ☐ 376 Qui Tam (31 USC 3729(a)) ☐ 400 State Reapportionment ☐ 410 Antitrust ☐ 430 Banks and Banking ☐ 450 Commerce ☐ 460 Deportation ☐ 470 Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations ☐ 480 Consumer Credit (15 USC 1681 or 1692) ☐ 485 Telephone Consumer Protection Act ☐ 490 Cable/Sat TV ☐ 850 Securities/Commodities/Exchange ☐ 890 Other Statutory Actions ☐ 891 Agricultural Acts ☐ 893 Environmental Matters ☐ 895 Freedom of Information Act ☐ 896 Arbitration ☐ 899 Administrative Procedure Act/Review or Appeal of Agency Decision ☐ 950 Constitutionality of State Statutes
REAL PROPERTY ☐ 210 Land Condemnation ☐ 220 Foreclosure ☐ 230 Rent Lease & Ejectment ☐ 240 Torts to Land ☐ 245 Tort Product Liability ☐ 290 All Other Real Property	CIVIL RIGHTS ☐ 440 Other Civil Rights ☐ 441 Voting ☐ 442 Employment ☐ 443 Housing/Accommodations ☐ 445 Amer. w/Disabilities - Employment ☐ 446 Amer. w/Disabilities - Other ☐ 448 Education PRISONER PETITIONS Habeas Corpus: ☐ 463 Alien Detainee ☐ 510 Motions to Vacate Sentence ☐ 530 General ☐ 535 Death Penalty Other: ☐ 540 Mandamus & Other ☐ 550 Civil Rights ☐ 555 Prison Condition ☐ 560 Civil Detainee - Conditions of Confinement			

V. ORIGIN (Place an "X" in One Box Only)

- ☒ 1 Original Proceeding ☐ 2 Removed from State Court ☐ 3 Remanded from Appellate Court ☐ 4 Reinstated or Reopened ☐ 5 Transferred from Another District (specify) ☐ 6 Multidistrict Litigation - Transfer ☐ 8 Multidistrict Litigation - Direct File

VI. CAUSE OF ACTION

Cite the U.S. Civil Statute under which you are filing (Do not cite jurisdictional statutes unless diversity):
29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq.

Brief description of cause:

Collective action for former and current employees who are owed wages and overtime compensation

VII. REQUESTED IN COMPLAINT:

☒ CHECK IF THIS IS A CLASS ACTION UNDER RULE 23, F.R.Cv.P.

DEMAND \$

CHECK YES only if demanded in complaint:

JURY DEMAND: ☒ Yes ☐ No

VIII. RELATED CASE(S) IF ANY

(See instructions):

JUDGE _____ DOCKET NUMBER _____

DATE

08/25/2026

SIGNATURE OF ATTORNEY OF RECORD

/s/ Achchana Ranasinghe

FOR OFFICE USE ONLY

RECEIPT # _____ AMOUNT _____ APPLYING IFP _____ JUDGE _____ MAG. JUDGE _____

INSTRUCTIONS FOR ATTORNEYS COMPLETING CIVIL COVER SHEET FORM JS 44**Authority For Civil Cover Sheet**

The JS 44 civil cover sheet and the information contained herein neither replaces nor supplements the filings and service of pleading or other papers as required by law, except as provided by local rules of court. This form, approved by the Judicial Conference of the United States in September 1974, is required for the use of the Clerk of Court for the purpose of initiating the civil docket sheet. Consequently, a civil cover sheet is submitted to the Clerk of Court for each civil complaint filed. The attorney filing a case should complete the form as follows:

- I.(a) Plaintiffs-Defendants.** Enter names (last, first, middle initial) of plaintiff and defendant. If the plaintiff or defendant is a government agency, use only the full name or standard abbreviations. If the plaintiff or defendant is an official within a government agency, identify first the agency and then the official, giving both name and title.
 - (b) County of Residence.** For each civil case filed, except U.S. plaintiff cases, enter the name of the county where the first listed plaintiff resides at the time of filing. In U.S. plaintiff cases, enter the name of the county in which the first listed defendant resides at the time of filing. (NOTE: In land condemnation cases, the county of residence of the "defendant" is the location of the tract of land involved.)
 - (c) Attorneys.** Enter the firm name, address, telephone number, and attorney of record. If there are several attorneys, list them on an attachment, noting in this section "(see attachment)".
- II. Jurisdiction.** The basis of jurisdiction is set forth under Rule 8(a), F.R.Cv.P., which requires that jurisdictions be shown in pleadings. Place an "X" in one of the boxes. If there is more than one basis of jurisdiction, precedence is given in the order shown below.
- United States plaintiff. (1) Jurisdiction based on 28 U.S.C. 1345 and 1348. Suits by agencies and officers of the United States are included here. United States defendant. (2) When the plaintiff is suing the United States, its officers or agencies, place an "X" in this box.
- Federal question. (3) This refers to suits under 28 U.S.C. 1331, where jurisdiction arises under the Constitution of the United States, an amendment to the Constitution, an act of Congress or a treaty of the United States. In cases where the U.S. is a party, the U.S. plaintiff or defendant code takes precedence, and box 1 or 2 should be marked.
- Diversity of citizenship. (4) This refers to suits under 28 U.S.C. 1332, where parties are citizens of different states. When Box 4 is checked, the citizenship of the different parties must be checked. (See Section III below; **NOTE: federal question actions take precedence over diversity cases.**)
- III. Residence (citizenship) of Principal Parties.** This section of the JS 44 is to be completed if diversity of citizenship was indicated above. Mark this section for each principal party.
- IV. Nature of Suit.** Place an "X" in the appropriate box. If there are multiple nature of suit codes associated with the case, pick the nature of suit code that is most applicable. Click here for: [Nature of Suit Code Descriptions](#).
- V. Origin.** Place an "X" in one of the seven boxes.
- Original Proceedings. (1) Cases which originate in the United States district courts.
- Removed from State Court. (2) Proceedings initiated in state courts may be removed to the district courts under Title 28 U.S.C., Section 1441.
- Remanded from Appellate Court. (3) Check this box for cases remanded to the district court for further action. Use the date of remand as the filing date.
- Reinstated or Reopened. (4) Check this box for cases reinstated or reopened in the district court. Use the reopening date as the filing date.
- Transferred from Another District. (5) For cases transferred under Title 28 U.S.C. Section 1404(a). Do not use this for within district transfers or multidistrict litigation transfers.
- Multidistrict Litigation – Transfer. (6) Check this box when a multidistrict case is transferred into the district under authority of Title 28 U.S.C. Section 1407.
- Multidistrict Litigation – Direct File. (8) Check this box when a multidistrict case is filed in the same district as the Master MDL docket.
- PLEASE NOTE THAT THERE IS NOT AN ORIGIN CODE 7.** Origin Code 7 was used for historical records and is no longer relevant due to changes in statute.
- VI. Cause of Action.** Report the civil statute directly related to the cause of action and give a brief description of the cause. **Do not cite jurisdictional statutes unless diversity.** Example: U.S. Civil Statute: 47 USC 553 Brief Description: Unauthorized reception of cable service.
- VII. Requested in Complaint.** Class Action. Place an "X" in this box if you are filing a class action under Rule 23, F.R.Cv.P.
- Demand. In this space enter the actual dollar amount being demanded or indicate other demand, such as a preliminary injunction.
- Jury Demand. Check the appropriate box to indicate whether or not a jury is being demanded.
- VIII. Related Cases.** This section of the JS 44 is used to reference related cases, if any. If there are related cases, insert the docket numbers and the corresponding judge names for such cases.

Date and Attorney Signature. Date and sign the civil cover sheet.

**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA**

DESIGNATION FORM

Place of Accident, Incident, or Transaction: Malvern, Chester County, Pennsylvania and Washington, D.C.

RELATED CASE IF ANY: Case Number: _____ Judge: _____

- | | |
|---|------------------------------|
| 1. Does this case involve property included in an earlier numbered suit? | Yes ☐ |
| 2. Does this case involve a transaction or occurrence which was the subject of an earlier numbered suit? | Yes ☐ |
| 3. Does this case involve the validity or infringement of a patent which was the subject of an earlier numbered suit? | Yes ☐ |
| 4. Is this case a second or successive habeas corpus petition, social security appeal, or pro se case filed by the same individual? | Yes ☐ |
| 5. Is this case related to an earlier numbered suit even though none of the above categories apply?
If yes, attach an explanation. | Yes ☐ |

I certify that, to the best of my knowledge and belief, the within case ☐ is / ☒ is not related to any pending or previously terminated action in this court.

Civil Litigation Categories

A. Federal Question Cases:

- ☐ 1. Indemnity Contract, Marine Contract, and All Other Contracts)
- ☐ 2. FELA
- ☐ 3. Jones Act-Personal Injury
- ☐ 4. Antitrust
- ☒ 5. Wage and Hour Class Action/Collective Action
- ☐ 6. Patent
- ☐ 7. Copyright/Trademark
- ☐ 8. Employment
- ☐ 9. Labor-Management Relations
- ☐ 10. Civil Rights
- ☐ 11. Habeas Corpus
- ☐ 12. Securities Cases
- ☐ 13. Social Security Review Cases
- ☐ 14. Qui Tam Cases
- ☐ 15. Cases Seeking Systemic Relief ***see certification below***
- ☐ 16. All Other Federal Question Cases. (Please specify): _____

B. Diversity Jurisdiction Cases:

- ☐ 1. Insurance Contract and Other Contracts
- ☐ 2. Airplane Personal Injury
- ☐ 3. Assault, Defamation
- ☐ 4. Marine Personal Injury
- ☐ 5. Motor Vehicle Personal Injury
- ☐ 6. Other Personal Injury (Please specify): _____
- ☐ 7. Products Liability
- ☐ 8. All Other Diversity Cases: (Please specify) _____

I certify that, to the best of my knowledge and belief, that the remedy sought in this case ☐ does / ☒ does not have implications beyond the parties before the court and ☐ does / ☒ does not seek to bar or mandate statewide or nationwide enforcement of a state or federal law including a rule, regulation, policy, or order of the executive branch or a state or federal agency, whether by declaratory judgment and/or any form of injunctive relief.

ARBITRATION CERTIFICATION (CHECK ONLY ONE BOX BELOW)

I certify that, to the best of my knowledge and belief:

☒ Pursuant to Local Civil Rule 53.2(3), this case is not eligible for arbitration either because (1) it seeks relief other than money damages; (2) the money damages sought are in excess of \$150,000 exclusive of interest and costs; (3) it is a social security case, includes a prisoner as a party, or alleges a violation of a right secured by the U.S. Constitution, or (4) jurisdiction is based in whole or in part on 28 U.S.C. § 1343.

☐ None of the restrictions in Local Civil Rule 53.2 apply and this case is eligible for arbitration.

NOTE: A trial de novo will be by jury only if there has been compliance with F.R.C.P. 38.

EXHIBIT A

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

SHAYLA STURGIS , individually and on
behalf of others similarly situated,

Plaintiff,

vs.

ALBERTSONS COMPANIES, INC. and
SAFEWAY INC.,,

Defendant(s).

CONSENT TO SUE

I consent to the filing of this form in, and to join and become a plaintiff in the above-captioned collective action lawsuit, to pursue my claim for unpaid wages, while working in the position(s) of employee for the Defendant(s) ALBERTSONS COMPANIES, INC. and SAFEWAY INC., at any time within the period of the last three years. I understand that this lawsuit seeks unpaid wages, liquidated damages, and attorneys' fees and costs under the FLSA and similar relief under applicable state wage-and- hour laws. I further consent to bringing these claims on a collective and/or class basis with other current/former employees of Defendant(s), to be represented by Brown, LLC, and to be bound by any settlement of this action or adjudication by the Court.

Signed: Shayla Sturgis Dated: 08/24/2026

Name: Shayla Sturgis